In
a post on the Harvard Law Review Forum, Paul
Clement and Neal Katyal recently addressed a question that has lingered over the two most recent quadrennial presidential elections: the ticklish question of eligibility to be elected President.
Setting aside more considerable qualification considerations, such as experience managing a large-scale enterprise, familiarity with and competence for the duties of the office, and the like, the question they addressed pertained to one particular qualification for the Presidency stated in the Constitution. To be elected, that qualification requires one to be a “Natural Born Citizen” of theUnited States .
That phrase, “Natural Born Citizen,” appears nowhere else in the Constitution
as originally enacted. It stands in contrast to its single exception, allowing
one to be elected president though not a “Natural Born Citizen” if, “a citizen
of the United States ,
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”
Alternative meanings of the Natural Born Citizen provision of the Qualifications Clause of Article II have been, or could be, proposed.
In fact, several methods can be identified for giving meaning to any word, phrase, clause, section, or article of the Constitution. Consider, for example, the contrast between a view that the Constitution is a document of fixed, determinate meaning, and a contrary view that the Constitution is an organic document the words, phrases, clauses, sections, and articles of which may acquire new meaning over time. The former view, the one of a “hide-bound” Constitution, is often invoked by critics to describe the philosophy of Antonin Scalia and others who share his approach to construing the Constitution. The latter view, of the Constitution as a living, breathing, and evolving document, has often been invoked to describe the philosophy of justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Stephen Breyer.
I have never worked with Neal Katyal.
As Senior Counsel with theAmerican
Center
Yes, I did just bring Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence into the conversation; and, yes, I realize that he did not participate in the drafting of the Constitution. ButJefferson was an
early watchman on the walls against judicial tyranny.
In a letter to Judge Spencer Roane, dated September 6, 1819, Jefferson debunked a view, asserted by the Supreme Court, that it had the position of ultimate interpretation of the Constitution, over the coordinate branches, the Legislative and the Executive. Such a construction of the Constitution created the serious risk of tyranny by the Judiciary.Jefferson
explained, “The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the
hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they
please.”
I treasureJefferson ’s view – of the
Constitution as a hide-bound document of fixed and discernible meaning – and
his warning – that judges might treat it as a waxen plaything, softening it
with the touch of their analyses and decisions until it took the shape of their
desires.
But even among us hide-bounders differences in approach to and resolution of constitutional questions will arise. Clement’s recent joint post, with Katyal, on the Harvard Law Review Forum, addressing the Natural Born Citizen provision of the Presidential Qualification Clause proves the point.
Clement and Katyal commit a regrettable error in construing the strands of English legal history that form the foundation of America's legal history. They seek, as lawyers and judges will do, to provide a particular meaning to a constitutional provision; in fact, they present a purposive interpretation of the history of the question of the Natural Born Citizenship requirement of Article II; that interpretation is not one obvious from the language of the document.
As an initial matter, Clement and Katyal seek to induce a sense that the constitutional phrase "natural born citizen" is uncertain of meaning. Given uncertain meaning, as our courts have played the Judicial Supremacy game, judges (and approved armchair quarterbacks) lend their service by “discovering” "authoritatively" the meaning to be ascribed to the uncertain provision.
Mark DeWolfe Howe, a legal historian, described this judicial habit. He observed its repetition by Supreme Court justices who rewrote the scope and meaning of the Establishment Clause in a series of decisions from the late 1940s through the early 1960s. In “The Garden and the Wilderness,” Howe skewered the enterprising justices for being artisans of the history of the law, rather than pupils of it.
Setting aside more considerable qualification considerations, such as experience managing a large-scale enterprise, familiarity with and competence for the duties of the office, and the like, the question they addressed pertained to one particular qualification for the Presidency stated in the Constitution. To be elected, that qualification requires one to be a “Natural Born Citizen” of the
Alternative meanings of the Natural Born Citizen provision of the Qualifications Clause of Article II have been, or could be, proposed.
In fact, several methods can be identified for giving meaning to any word, phrase, clause, section, or article of the Constitution. Consider, for example, the contrast between a view that the Constitution is a document of fixed, determinate meaning, and a contrary view that the Constitution is an organic document the words, phrases, clauses, sections, and articles of which may acquire new meaning over time. The former view, the one of a “hide-bound” Constitution, is often invoked by critics to describe the philosophy of Antonin Scalia and others who share his approach to construing the Constitution. The latter view, of the Constitution as a living, breathing, and evolving document, has often been invoked to describe the philosophy of justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Stephen Breyer.
I have never worked with Neal Katyal.
As Senior Counsel with the
Yes, I did just bring Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence into the conversation; and, yes, I realize that he did not participate in the drafting of the Constitution. But
In a letter to Judge Spencer Roane, dated September 6, 1819, Jefferson debunked a view, asserted by the Supreme Court, that it had the position of ultimate interpretation of the Constitution, over the coordinate branches, the Legislative and the Executive. Such a construction of the Constitution created the serious risk of tyranny by the Judiciary.
I treasure
But even among us hide-bounders differences in approach to and resolution of constitutional questions will arise. Clement’s recent joint post, with Katyal, on the Harvard Law Review Forum, addressing the Natural Born Citizen provision of the Presidential Qualification Clause proves the point.
Clement and Katyal commit a regrettable error in construing the strands of English legal history that form the foundation of America's legal history. They seek, as lawyers and judges will do, to provide a particular meaning to a constitutional provision; in fact, they present a purposive interpretation of the history of the question of the Natural Born Citizenship requirement of Article II; that interpretation is not one obvious from the language of the document.
As an initial matter, Clement and Katyal seek to induce a sense that the constitutional phrase "natural born citizen" is uncertain of meaning. Given uncertain meaning, as our courts have played the Judicial Supremacy game, judges (and approved armchair quarterbacks) lend their service by “discovering” "authoritatively" the meaning to be ascribed to the uncertain provision.
Mark DeWolfe Howe, a legal historian, described this judicial habit. He observed its repetition by Supreme Court justices who rewrote the scope and meaning of the Establishment Clause in a series of decisions from the late 1940s through the early 1960s. In “The Garden and the Wilderness,” Howe skewered the enterprising justices for being artisans of the history of the law, rather than pupils of it.
Though he did not use the precise term, he suggested that
the pretend historians of the Supreme Court were no more to be believed than
was Aaron when he told Moses that he had not fashioned a golden calf while
Moses was on the Mount but had only thrown gold into the fire, and the idol
fashioned itself.
Clement and Katyal would have nothing about which to write on the subject of the Natural Born Citizen language, however, unless the meaning of the phrase was, in fact, fraught with uncertainty. Given six continuous years of controversy over the question of Barack Obama's status as a Natural Born Citizen – a contentious debate disdainfully summarized as the “birther argument" – perhaps we must simply accept that a rather clear and seemingly precise phrase, “Natural Born Citizen,” is neither clear nor precise or at least that it is only as clear and precise as Clement and Katyal will then show it to be.
What Clement and Katyal do is to attempt to establish that a phrase of plain meaning and import was not intended as such by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. That obvious meaning, it seems to this reader, is that one is Natural Born Citizen if one’s citizenship arises as a consequence of their natural birth within the United States.
On this point, English common law is instructive.
Every one of the newly independent States adopted English common law as a rule for the decision of cases until modified or repealed by acts of their legislatures. While we rejected the tyranny of the Crown and disassociated ourselves from our brothers in Parliament because of their indifference to our suffering, we retained the majesty of the English common law. [For those to whom English common law is an unfamiliar concept, it is the entire body of judicial made law resulting from the decision of cases in England over the course of centuries. By adopting English common law, newly independent States generally populated with Englishmen and their descendants retained a familiar and workable body of law for the resolution of disputes.]
Under English common law, there was no such thing as a “Natural Born Citizen.”
Rather, a different but related concept existed, “Natural Born Subjects of the Crown” or “Natural Born Subjects.” The concern over one's status in England as a “Natural Born Subject” existed for many reasons. A primary reason for needing certainty about status as a “Natural Born Subject” was that English law limited hereditary title and the capability to inherit properties to those who were “Natural Born Subjects.” Thus, one’s status – whether one was a Natural Born Subject – could powerfully affect the course of one’s life. And, as it turns out, under English common law, only a person born within the realm ofGreat
Britain , within the kingdom, could lay claim
to status as a “Natural Born Subject.”
As it turns out, the meaning of “natural born” in English common law is too confining for their purposes, it must be stretched. That stretching is the hallmark of their error and their erroneous conclusions regarding the eligibility of Ted Cruz, John McCain, and George Romney (Mitt’s dad) to be elected to the Presidency.
Their conclusion conflates English statute law and English common law.
The significance of that conflation cannot be overstated. As noted, under English common law, only persons born within the realm were entitled to status as “Natural Born Subjects.” Hard choices faced those living with such a reality. Called to service, engaged in mercantile trade, traveling for study, many reasons provoked Natural Born Subject to remove to other lands. Living abroad – even in service to the country and Crown – would risk that offspring would suffer disinheritance of title and property. So Parliament necessarily, wisely, granted to specific categories of persons born abroad status as Natural Born Subjects.
In fact, Clement and Katyal gloss over this dichotomy. English statutory law, enacted by Parliament, extended “Natural Born Subject” status to additional classes of persons not within the English common law’s sweep of the term. It is from that premise – Parliament’s expansion of the scope of “Natural Born Subject” – that Clement and Katyal illogically leap. The leap is illogical because they refer to the vaunted role of English common law in understanding our early legal history and as a source work for understanding the Constitution but then invoke English statute law to give meaning to our Constitution’s “Natural Born Citizen” provision. But what was transmitted, via the adoption of English common law in the newly independent States of 1776, was that Natural Born Citizen status would be determined, not by parentage, but by birth within one of the united States (or citizenship in them at the time of the adoption of the Constitution).
Through the Constitution, the People and the States granted limited legislative power to the Congress of theUnited States .
The Constitution defines the scope of, and the appropriate subjects of, that donated legislative power.
Among the powers given solely to it, the People and the States provided, in Article I, Section 8, that Congress had authority “to make a uniform rule of Naturalization.” “Naturalization” converts one that was a foreigner, an alien, into a citizen.
In theUnited States ,
whatever requirements for naturalized citizenship set by the Constitutions and
laws of each of the thirteen independent States would be superseded by such
“uniform rule of naturalization” as Congress might enact.
Clement and Katyal would have nothing about which to write on the subject of the Natural Born Citizen language, however, unless the meaning of the phrase was, in fact, fraught with uncertainty. Given six continuous years of controversy over the question of Barack Obama's status as a Natural Born Citizen – a contentious debate disdainfully summarized as the “birther argument" – perhaps we must simply accept that a rather clear and seemingly precise phrase, “Natural Born Citizen,” is neither clear nor precise or at least that it is only as clear and precise as Clement and Katyal will then show it to be.
What Clement and Katyal do is to attempt to establish that a phrase of plain meaning and import was not intended as such by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. That obvious meaning, it seems to this reader, is that one is Natural Born Citizen if one’s citizenship arises as a consequence of their natural birth within the United States.
On this point, English common law is instructive.
Every one of the newly independent States adopted English common law as a rule for the decision of cases until modified or repealed by acts of their legislatures. While we rejected the tyranny of the Crown and disassociated ourselves from our brothers in Parliament because of their indifference to our suffering, we retained the majesty of the English common law. [For those to whom English common law is an unfamiliar concept, it is the entire body of judicial made law resulting from the decision of cases in England over the course of centuries. By adopting English common law, newly independent States generally populated with Englishmen and their descendants retained a familiar and workable body of law for the resolution of disputes.]
Under English common law, there was no such thing as a “Natural Born Citizen.”
Rather, a different but related concept existed, “Natural Born Subjects of the Crown” or “Natural Born Subjects.” The concern over one's status in England as a “Natural Born Subject” existed for many reasons. A primary reason for needing certainty about status as a “Natural Born Subject” was that English law limited hereditary title and the capability to inherit properties to those who were “Natural Born Subjects.” Thus, one’s status – whether one was a Natural Born Subject – could powerfully affect the course of one’s life. And, as it turns out, under English common law, only a person born within the realm of
As it turns out, the meaning of “natural born” in English common law is too confining for their purposes, it must be stretched. That stretching is the hallmark of their error and their erroneous conclusions regarding the eligibility of Ted Cruz, John McCain, and George Romney (Mitt’s dad) to be elected to the Presidency.
Their conclusion conflates English statute law and English common law.
The significance of that conflation cannot be overstated. As noted, under English common law, only persons born within the realm were entitled to status as “Natural Born Subjects.” Hard choices faced those living with such a reality. Called to service, engaged in mercantile trade, traveling for study, many reasons provoked Natural Born Subject to remove to other lands. Living abroad – even in service to the country and Crown – would risk that offspring would suffer disinheritance of title and property. So Parliament necessarily, wisely, granted to specific categories of persons born abroad status as Natural Born Subjects.
In fact, Clement and Katyal gloss over this dichotomy. English statutory law, enacted by Parliament, extended “Natural Born Subject” status to additional classes of persons not within the English common law’s sweep of the term. It is from that premise – Parliament’s expansion of the scope of “Natural Born Subject” – that Clement and Katyal illogically leap. The leap is illogical because they refer to the vaunted role of English common law in understanding our early legal history and as a source work for understanding the Constitution but then invoke English statute law to give meaning to our Constitution’s “Natural Born Citizen” provision. But what was transmitted, via the adoption of English common law in the newly independent States of 1776, was that Natural Born Citizen status would be determined, not by parentage, but by birth within one of the united States (or citizenship in them at the time of the adoption of the Constitution).
Through the Constitution, the People and the States granted limited legislative power to the Congress of the
Among the powers given solely to it, the People and the States provided, in Article I, Section 8, that Congress had authority “to make a uniform rule of Naturalization.” “Naturalization” converts one that was a foreigner, an alien, into a citizen.
In the
And, as
Clement and Katyal point out, Congress quickly acted to adopt such a uniform
rule of naturalization, the Naturalization
Act, exercising its Naturalization Clause power to create such uniform rules as it did.
To the contrary, however, the decision of Congress, when it enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, to extend Natural Born Citizen status to persons who were not, in fact, by operation of the common law, "Natural Born Citizens" was not a proper exercise of the Naturalization Clause power. (Congress reversed that exact position just five years later when it repealed that Act by adoption of the Naturalization Act of 1795.)
The essence of naturalization is to make one a citizen that is not a citizen.
So the whole, express, power of Congress concerning citizenship is related to naturalization, and it is limited to the task, of making, as it were, citizens out of whole cloth. But therein lays the rub for Clement and Katyal. While Parliament had the power to grant Natural Born Subject status to persons denied that status by operation of common law, the Congress of the United States is a legislative body of limited and defined powers.
For Clement and Katyal to succeed, they must identify a legitimate ground upon which Congress could expand the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen provision.
To the contrary, however, the decision of Congress, when it enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, to extend Natural Born Citizen status to persons who were not, in fact, by operation of the common law, "Natural Born Citizens" was not a proper exercise of the Naturalization Clause power. (Congress reversed that exact position just five years later when it repealed that Act by adoption of the Naturalization Act of 1795.)
The essence of naturalization is to make one a citizen that is not a citizen.
So the whole, express, power of Congress concerning citizenship is related to naturalization, and it is limited to the task, of making, as it were, citizens out of whole cloth. But therein lays the rub for Clement and Katyal. While Parliament had the power to grant Natural Born Subject status to persons denied that status by operation of common law, the Congress of the United States is a legislative body of limited and defined powers.
For Clement and Katyal to succeed, they must identify a legitimate ground upon which Congress could expand the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen provision.
Though decades of sifting
have sought it out, no Revisionary Power Clause extends such power to
Congress, the Courts, or the President, anywhere in the Constitution.
There is, of course, Article V, with its established processes for amending the Constitution. The Naturalization Act was not such an amendatory
exercise.
So, the Naturalization Act notwithstanding, the question will remain whether the candidate was born in the United States to parents not present here on diplomatic service from another Nation. If that analysis governs, Clement and Katyal have reached the wrong conclusions about the eligibility of Ted Cruz, John McCain, and George Romney to be elected President. While each of these would certainly be entitled to claim citizenship under the Naturalization Act, none is a Natural Born Citizen.
So, the Naturalization Act notwithstanding, the question will remain whether the candidate was born in the United States to parents not present here on diplomatic service from another Nation. If that analysis governs, Clement and Katyal have reached the wrong conclusions about the eligibility of Ted Cruz, John McCain, and George Romney to be elected President. While each of these would certainly be entitled to claim citizenship under the Naturalization Act, none is a Natural Born Citizen.
